Abstract-Broadcast communication is a dominant communication pattern in WSN. As a major security concern, the broadcast source authentication is needed to mitigate impersonation of a broadcast source, modifications of its broadcasted data, or depletion of the limited energy of sensors caused by an attacker injecting useless broadcast traffic. Several Broadcast Source Authentication Protocols (BSAPs) were proposed in the literature. One class of them is time asymmetry-based BSAPs like μTESLA [1] protocol. These BSAPs operate delayed key-disclosure to secure broadcast communications, but they suffer from a kind of DoS attack, called resource-draining attack, in which an attacker floods the network with fake messages that all sensors of the network buffer and forward, then later verify, thus causing buffer overflow and batteries depletion. In this paper we propose the H 2 BSAP protocol, to overcome this kind of DoS attacks, by achieving a hop-by-hop authentication of broadcasted messages, thus limiting the damage of an attacker to its one-hop neighbors only, instead of the entire network.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless sensors networks (WSN), broadcast communications are common usage to collect data from sensors, distribute software update or routing update information, etc. As an example, once nodes are deployed, the base station (BS) can proceed to wireless network programming (ex: Deluge [2] ) to broadcast the updated software so sensors of the WSN self update. In addition, network flooding by the BS is needed when requesting information from the WSN, especially in WSN implementing data centric routing protocols where no global identification space exists for sensors [3] . However, broadcast communications need to be carefully secured, otherwise disastrous consequences will arise if an attacker takes advantage from broadcast communications to launch a local or a global attack against the network. For instance, an attacker can use wireless network programming to compromise all nodes of the network by broadcasting a malicious code as an updated software sent by the BS, or it can broadcast useless messages in order to deplete the batteries of sensors. To prevent the network from such attacks, a broadcast source must authenticate each message, by broadcasting both the message and an authenticator (i.e. MAC, signature) computed over the message with some key materials. Receivers verify the authenticity of both the broadcast source and the message, using some authentication procedure, before accepting it as valid. Likely, receivers are ensured that the identity of the broadcast source is the claimed identity, and that received messages are authentic.
Several broadcast source authentication protocols (BSAPs) for WSN were proposed in the literature. These protocols can be divided in two main classes: BSAPs providing delayed authentication [1] [4] [5] , and BSAPs providing immediate authentication [6] [7] [8] . The first class achieves delayed authentication of broadcasted data, and is based on delayed key disclosure, where the source uses a key K to authenticate its data at instant t and later discloses K at instant t + δt to allow receivers verify data. The second class achieves immediate authentication of broadcasted data and is based on key asymmetry between source and receivers, where both source and receivers use a distinct set of keys to authenticate and verify data, respectively. BSAPs providing delayed authentication are known for their low computation overhead, and low transmission overhead (small-size authenticator per-packet), but due to the key disclosure delay, they are target to resource-draining DoS attacks, in which an attacker aims to cause sensors' buffer overflow, and deplete sensors batteries by making them forwarding useless data. In the other hand, key-asymmetry based BSAPs are known for their heavy computation overhead (especially those based on digital signatures) and a high transmission overhead (big-size authenticator per-packet), but are more immune to resource-draining DoS attack, where only few-hop neighbors of the attacker are affected by the attack and not the entire network as in the previous class.
In this paper, we investigate resource-draining DoS attacks in time-asymmetry based BSAPs, and propose H 2 BSAP , an efficient hop-by-hop time-asymmetry based BSAP, that limits the effects of resource-draining DoS attack to the one-hop neighbors of the attacker only, while introducing an acceptable extra computation and transmission overheads on the network. Unlike other time-asymmetry BSAPs, in which sensors buffer/forward data, then later verify them, which let them an easy target to resource-draining DoS attacks, in H 2 BSAP , sensors buffer data, then later verify them, and only if data is authentic, forward them.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we overview some time asymmetry based BSAPs, and see the impact of resource-draining DoS attacks on them. In section III, we describe our assumptions, our network model, the assumed adversary model and the adopted notations. In section IV and section V, we describe our proposed protocol, and we give a detailed security analysis of it in section VI. In section VII, we give the computation, storage and transmission overheads of our protocol. In section VIII we give the limits and propose improvement of our protocol, and we conclude our work in section IX.
II. OVERVIEW OF TIME-ASYMMETRY BASED BSAPS
This class of protocols uses only efficient symmetric key cryptography to achieve secure broadcast source authentication. It introduces time asymmetry in order to prevent source impersonation due to usage of shared symmetric keys, that the source uses to authenticate messages it broadcasts, and receivers use to verify the authenticity of the messages. Time-asymmetry based BSAPs assume that receivers are loosely time synchronized with the sender. Each key the source uses to authenticate data, is valid only during a predetermined time interval, after which it is no longer valid. A key Ki the source uses to authenticate data it sends during time interval Ii, is later divulged after a time δt which is equal to or greater than the maximum propagation delay in the network. Below, we describe μTESLA protocol [1] , which is the most known time-asymmetry based BSAP for WSN.
A. Overview of μTESLA protocol
The BS, which is the main source in the network, generates a one way key chain {Kn} of n+1 elements (K0, ..., Kn), by recursively applying a hash function H on a random secret key Kn, where Ki = H(Ki+1), and K0 is the commitment key. The particularity of a key chain, is that having any authentic key Kj, j ≥ 0, we can easily verify any future key Ki, i > j, without being able to predict it. Then, the BS divides time into n time intervals I1, I2, ..., In of equal duration Tint, where Ti = T0 + i × Tint, is the beginning of time interval Ii = [Ti, Ti+1[. All nodes of the network are initially preloaded with the key-chain parameters (K0, T0, Tint, δ, ...).
The BS uses key Ki, i ≥ 1, to authenticate (generate MACs over) packets it broadcasts in time interval Ii. Each broadcast packet carries the index of the interval in which it was sent. At the beginning of time interval i+δ (I i+δ ), the BS divulges Ki to allow receivers verify the buffered packets, where δ × Tint is greater than the maximum propagation delay in the network.
Upon reception of a packet P k broadcasted in time interval Ii, a receiver R checks if P k verifies the weak security condition in order to buffer it. The weak security condition to verify, is that the BS is not in a time interval in which key Ki used during Ii is already divulged, in order to ensure that P k could not be spoofed by an adversary. If tc is the local time at which packet P k was received, and εBS,R is the time synchronization error between R and the BS, the weak security condition to be verified is that
Once the BS discloses Ki, a receiver verifies the key by checking if Kj = H i−j (Ki), where Kj, j < i, is the latest verified key the receiver posses (initially K0). Once the key is verified, the receiver stores Kj instead of Ki and verifies the buffered packets sent by the BS in interval Ii using Ki.
Due to the key disclosure delay δ, which is the same for all sensors, μTESLA is vulnerable to resource-draining DoS attacks. Indeed, during time interval Ii, an attacker can send an important amount of bogus packets, claiming that they were sent by the BS in interval Ii. Sensors check that key Ki is not yet disclosed, then buffer the fake packets for δ time intervals, which cause buffer overflow, where legitimate packets sent by the BS are erased by fake packets. More dangerously, because sensors act as routers, and because they first forward data, then later verify them, most nodes of the network deplete their energy on forwarding fake packets. Thus, just a single attacker can generate a resource-draining DoS attack, causing a severe damage to the entire network. Moreover, detecting the faulty node which generated the fake packets is not trivial. Indeed, because each node forwards data, then later verifies it, each node in the network forwarding fake packets, claims that it receives the fake packets from its upstream parents, thus an attacker can never be localized and clearly identified.
III. BACKGROUND

A. Assumptions and Network model
First, we assume that the dimension of the deployment area is known in advance, and is for instance L × L square. In addition, we assume that each node in the network has a fixed communication range of Rmax. For simplicity, we assume that the BS is in the middle of the deployment area.
Second, we assume that the BS is static and that sensors are static once deployed, whereas attackers can be mobile.
Third, we assume that the network depth is at most l-hop (see figure 1 ). This means that the farthest node from the BS, is l-hop away far from the BS. Estimating the maximum depth of the network, can be deduced from estimating the maximum propagation delay in the network.
Fourth we do not assume any pre-knowledge or post-knowledge of sensors deployment coordinates. However, if sensors deployment coordinates were available, our protocol will achieve better performances.
Fifth, we assume that each node in the network participates in the broadcast process, by rebroadcasting a freshly received packets to its one-hop neighbors.
Finally, as in μTESLA, we assume that the BS is the main broadcast source in the network, and that sensors are loosely time synchronized with the BS. All sensors of the network trust the BS.
B. Adversary model and security objectives
The main objective of an attacker is to launch a resource-draining DoS attack, where it broadcasts fake packets that the maximum number of sensors in the network buffer and forward. Damage is maximum when all sensors of the network buffer and forward the fake packets sent by a single attacker in the network. In μTESLA, a single attacker can cause a resource-draining DoS attack on the entire network. We assume that several attackers, which can be mobile, can exist in the network, and that attackers can collude to launch distributed resource-draining DoS attacks. Attackers can communicate directly if they are in the communication range of each others, or can use a low latency out-of-band communication channel (wired communication channel) to communicate if they are multi-hop away from each others. It is clear that launching a resource-draining DoS attack on the entire network with the minimum set of attackers (ideally a single attacker) is the objective of attackers.
Our main objective, is to secure the WSN against broadcast source impersonation, broadcast data source modification/fabrication and resource-draining DoS attack. While all time-asymmetry based BSAPs provide the two first security services, all of them fail to thwart efficiently resource-draining DoS attacks, where a single attacker can generate a resource-draining DoS attack on the entire network. So our main contribution, regarding other time-asymmetry based BSAPs, is to efficiently defend against resource-draining DoS attacks, by limiting the impact of the attack to the one-hop neighbors of the attacker only. 
C. Notations
For clarity, the symbols and notations used throughout the paper are listed in table I.
IV. MOTIVATION AND MAIN IDEA OF H 2 BSAP
The development of H 2 BSAP is mainly motivated by the observation we made about time-asymmetry based BSAPs. Most of the time-asymmetry BSAPs we found in literature, have a low computation and transmission overhead for authentication/verification and transport of broadcasted data. However, they all suffer from resource-draining DoS attacks. A single attacker, can cause buffer overflow and rapid energy depletion on all sensors of the network, by continuously sending fake data. This attack is made possible because of the following observations:
• Nodes adopt the principle of "First buffer data and forward them, then later verify them". As a consequence, if the received packets verify the weak security condition (the used authentication key is not yet disclosed) and are first time received, nodes must buffer/forward them, regardless whether they are really authentic or not. For an attacker, it is easy to broadcast fake packets verifying the weak security condition, knowing the key chainparameters (disclosure delay δ, time interval duration Tint, time reference T0) of the source.
• The broadcast source uses a single key-chain to authenticate its data, where the disclosure delay δ of the key-chain is generally chosen to be greater than the maximum propagation delay in the network. Because sensors must buffer packets of one time interval at least during one disclosure delay (δ time intervals),the longer is the time interval Tint, the more data sensors will buffer, and the more severe are the damages caused by a resourcedraining DoS attack.
To defend against resource-draining DoS attacks on timeasymmetry based BSAPs, nodes must adopt the principle of "First buffer data, then later verify them, and only if authentic, forward them". In other words, we must achieve a hop-by-hop verification of broadcasted data, to limit the damage of resource-draining DoS attack to the one-hop neighbors of the attacker, as do BSAPs achieving immediate authentication [9] [6], which are based on digital signatures. However, using a single key-chain only, sensors can not adopt this principle, because there will be one key-disclosure delay for the entire network. Thus, we need several independent key-chains, with distinct key-disclosure delays, where the number of the used key-chains is equal to the maximum depth of the network in number of hops. Assuming the depth of the network is l hops, the BS uses l distinct key-chains {K 1 n }, ..., {K l n }, to authenticate its data, where each key chain {K r n } r=1,...,l , is used for the r-hop neighbors of the BS. The BS appends l distinct MACs to each packet sent in time interval Ii, using the current key K r i , of each key-chain {K r n } r=1,...,l . Upon reception of packets, each node u, depending on its hop-distance r from the BS, buffers the packets and waits for the disclosure of the appropriate key K r i . Once the key K r i is disclosed, u verifies the key and checks the buffered data authenticity, and forwards only authentic data to its neighbors, which are (r + 1)-hop away far from the BS. In this way, data are verified then propagated in a hop-by-hop way, and resource-draining DoS attack affects only the one-hop neighbors of the attacker. Moreover, nodes need to buffer data during a duration less than the duration of a key disclosure delay like in μTESLA. In the next section, we detail our solution
Our protocol involves three phases: initialization phase, data broadcast phase and data buffering/verification phase. In the initialization phase, the BS generates the necessary key-chains, and loads sensors with the key-chains parameters. In the data broadcast phase, the BS authenticates data it sends in the current time interval using the current key of each key-chain, and broadcasts the data, then later discloses the keys. In data buffering/verification phase, sensors of level r, that are r-hop away far from the BS buffer received data until the associated authentication key is disclosed, and only if the data is authentic, they forward them to the (r + 1)-hop neighbors of the BS.
A. Initialization phase
The BS divides time into n intervals of equal duration Tint, where Ti = T0 + i × Tint is the beginning of time interval Ii, and T0 is a time counting reference. Assuming that the depth (i n hops number) of the network is at most l, the BS generates l independent one way key-chains {K
, is generated from a secret random value K r n , using a hash function H, where
..,l is associated to the r-hop neighbors of the BS, where the BS uses {K r n } to authenticate its data to sensors which are r-hop away far from it. To each key-chain {K r n }, is associated a key-disclosure delay δr (δr time intervals), where δ1 < δ2 < ... < δ l (see figure 2) .
Sensors are initially preloaded with the parameters of all key-chains (T0, Tint, {K r 0 , δr} r=1,...,l ).
B. Data broadcast phase
The BS divides data it sends during time interval Ii in several messages Mi,j, where each message fits in one packet, and where j is the message index in the interval. To broadcast a message Mi,j the BS proceeds it as follows: • Second, the BS recursively authenticates Pi,j using the current key K (Pi,j), for r = l − 1 down to 1 in this order. Then, the BS sets Pi,j ← Pi,j Hop-count=1, where Hop-count is used to determine the hop-distance between receivers and the BS.
• Finally, the BS broadcasts Pi,j in the network, where Pi,j fits in one packet.
Later, the BS discloses keys K 
C. Data buffering/verification phase
A node u, receiving at instant tc a packet Pi,j (sent on interval Ii) proceeds it as follows:
1. If Pi,j was already received, u drops it. Pi,j is considered to be already received if it is already buffered, or if packets sent on time interval Ii were already received and verified by u with a smaller Hop-count value than the Hop-count value contained in the received packet Pi,j. 
D. Determining the key-chains disclosure delays
Security condition of time asymmetry based BSAPs, is based on delayed key-disclosure and loosely time synchronization between the source and the receivers. The key disclosure delay δ influences receivers performances. A large value of δ implies that receivers will buffer broadcasted packets for a long duration, resulting on an important storage overhead and a risk of buffer overflow on receivers. A small value of δ, may cause receivers rejecting part or most of the legitimate packets sent by the BSδ is usually chosen to be equal to or greater than the maximum transporting delay in the network, needed for packets of time interval Ii to travel from the BS to all nodes of the network through. Transporting delay includes the time needed for data to propagate into the entire network through, and any processing delay which applies to the transmitted data en-route through intermediate nodes.
As depicted before, in our protocol each key chain serves a subset of nodes of the network that are far away from the BS by the same number of hops. Thus {K r n } r=1,...,l , is used to authenticate data to the r-hop neighbors of the BS. For each key-chain {K r n } r=1,...,l , a disclosure delay δr is associated, where δ1 < δ2 < ... < δi < ... < δ l . We'll choose each δr value in such a way that δr × Tint is equal to or greater than the maximum transporting delay of a network of depth r. In what follows, we determine the appropriate value of key disclosure delay δr for each key-chain {K r n } r=1,...,l . Assume that all nodes have the same communication range, which is equal to Rmax meters (maximum transmission range), and assume that all nodes have the same output data rate which is equal to Outmax bps (maximum data output). Rmax and Outmax values are given by sensors' constructors. For TelosB and MicaZ sensors, Rmax=100 m and Outmax =250 Kbps = 250 000 bps. As a consequence, 1-hop neighbors of the BS are at most at distance Rmax from it, 2-hop neighbors of the BS are at most at distance 2 × Rmax from it, , and l-hop neighbors of the BS are at most at distance l × Rmax from it.
Knowing an upperbound of the propagation speed of our wireless signal (bounded by the speed of light in air), we can deduce the maximum propagation delay over 1-hop. Given a speed of light s light = 2×10 8 m.s −1 , the propagation time of a wireless signal over a one-hop communication range is tR max = Rmax 2×10 8 s. This means that a bit needs a time tR max , which is negligeable, to be transmitted over a one-hop of a distance Rmax. As a consequence, data sent by the BS in time interval Ii (at most the BS sends data during the entire interval), using key K 1 i needs a time Tint + tR max to reach the BS's 1-hop neighbors. Thus the disclosure delay can be set to δ1 = [
represents the smallest integer greater or equal to X. However, we can put δ1 = 1, although
> 1, because tR max is so extremely small, that the time needed for an attacker, upon reception of the key, to modify some packets of the BS and then send them to the BS's 1-hop neighbors, is greater than the time needed for the original packets to reach all the 1-hop neighbors of the BS.
The other keys disclosure delays δr, r = 2, ..., l, are computed based on the following parameters:
• δr−1: the disclosure delay of key chain {K 
T int ], with δ1 = 1. Now let explicitly describe each of the above parameters: ) + tR max to be sent and propagated from hop to hop. In addition, each node receiving the key applies a hash operation on it to verify it, in time Hashop.
• T Vr−1: T Vr−1 depends on the number of data sent by the BS in each time interval, and on the maximum buffer size of sensors to buffer the data. Assuming each sensor has a buffer of a maximum size of t packets, each sensor needs at most a time of t × MACop in-order to verify the buffered data, thus T Vr−1=t × MACop. Assuming the BS uses packets of size (29(payload) + 7(header)) bytes=288 bits as in TinyOS, the BS will send at most t =
Outmax×T int 288 packets during one time interval of duration Tint.
• T Sr−1→r: (r − 1)-hop neighbors of the BS need at most a time Tint +tR max to forward data sent by the BS in one time interval to the r-hop neighbors of the BS.
Finally, an appropriate value of a key-disclosure delay δi, i = 2, ..., l, can be written as δi
]. This value guarantees, with high probability, that when the BS discloses a key K r i , all the r-hop neighbors of the BS are assumed to have received the packets the BS sent in interval Ii.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF H 2 BSAP
In this section, we analyze the security of H 2 BSAP according to the following threats and attacks:
• Broadcast source identity usurpation and data modification: can an attacker successfully spoof the identity of the BS, and thus send data on behalf of it so receivers will accept it as valid? Can the attacker successfully modify the data sent by the BS and make receivers accept them as valid? • Resources-draining DoS attack: Can an attacker launch a resource-draining DoS attack on the network? and what is the portion of the network affected by the attack (number of nodes buffering and forwarding fake packets)?
A. Broadcast source identity usurpation and data modification
Upon reception of a packet Pi,j (sent on interval Ii) at instant tc, a receiver node u first checks the weak security condition of the packet Ti + δr−1 × Tint < tc + u,BS < Ti + δr × Tint before buffering it, where r = Pi,j.Hop-count and indicates the claimed hop-distance of u to he BS. Later, when the BS discloses the associated authentication key K r i , u verifies the key, then verifies the authenticity of buffered packets Pi,j sent in interval Ii. Assuming an attacker sends a fake packet P i,j on behalf of the BS, that verifies the weak security condition, node u will buffer the packet. P i,j can be either a fake message computed from scratch, or obtained from a currently sent packet Pi,j, by illegally changing any field of Pi,j (mainly the data Mi,j, the MAC and the Hop-count fields).
According to the weak security condition, at the instant of reception of P i,j , the BS has not yet disclosed key K r i , with r = P i,j .Hopcount, otherwise the packet will be dropped. Thus, the attacker can not compute the right MAC over P i,j . As a consequence, when the BS discloses key K r i , u will check the authenticity of Pi,j , and finding that the computed MAC is wrong, it discards the packet.
As a result, an attacker can not spoof the identity of the BS, or modify packets sent by it, and make receivers accept fake packets as legitimate packets sent by the BS.
B. Resources-draining DoS attack
Now, let see the impact on the network of a resource-draining DoS attack. The impact can be estimated by the number of affected nodes, that will buffer/forward fake packets. We distinguish here two cases:
• Case 1: a single attacker in the network.
• Case 2: a set of at least two attackers in the network. The attackers can be several-hop distant, and can communicate via an out-of-band low latency communication channel to launch a distributed resource-draining DoS attack. Resource-draining DoS attack in the presence of two colluding attackers
1) Resource-draining DoS attack in the presence of a single attacker:
The attacker generates a resource-draining DoS attack on the network, by broadcasting randomly generated fake packets, or modifying/altering legitimate packets sent by the BS.
As described in the previous section VI-A, the one-hop neighbors of the attacker will buffer the fake packets (if they verify the weak security condition, dropped otherwise), and will wait for the disclosure of the corresponding key. Once the key is disclosed, onehop neighbors of the attacker check its authenticity, then verify the authenticity of all buffered data, discard all the fake packets, and forward only valid packets. As a consequence, resource-draining DoS attack affects just part or all of the attacker's one-hop neighbors, whereas the remaining nodes, which represent the most part of the network, are uninfluenced by the attack. In μTESLA protocol, a single attacker launching a resource-draining DoS attack, can affect the entire network, where most/all nodes of the network will buffer/forward the fake packets it sends.
2) Resource-draining DoS attack in the presence of several attackers: Attackers can operate independently, or can collaborate and collude to generate a distributed resource-draining DoS attack on the network. In the latter case, attackers are assumed to have access to a low latency communication channel, allowing attackers which are several-hop far away from each other to directly communicate (wormhole attack, see figure 4 ).
In case each attacker operates independently, a resource-draining DoS attack launched by each attacker, only affects its one-hop neighbors. Thus, the impact of each attacker is seen as if it was the alone attacker in the network.
In case attackers collaborate, an attacker A 1 which is r-hop away far from the BS, upon reception of packets Pi,j with Hop-count=r, will send them to attacker A2 which is (r + d)-hop away far from the BS, through the created wormhole (see fig 4) , and A2 simply forwards the packets to its neighbors. Assuming that the BS has not yet disclosed key K r i , we distinguish two scenarios, depending on if packets were sent intact or modified by the attackers:
• If Pi,j.Hop-count field was modified (increased or decreased), A2's neighbors will reject the packets, because they do not satisfy the weak security condition.
• If Hop-count field was not modified, but Mi,j data or the MAC were modified, A2's neighbors will buffer packets, because they satisfy the weak security condition. However, they will later drop the packets, when key K r i is divulged, because the packets could not be verified.
• If packets Pi,j were sent intact without any modification, A2's neighbors buffer the packets, and later verify their authenticity once key K r i will be disclosed. In this case, attackers just speed the delivery of packets to reach nodes which are (r + d +1)-hop away far from the BS, through the wormhole. In this case, the Hop-count field of Pi,j does not reflect really the hop-distance of receivers to the BS, however, the intact valid packets sent through the wormhole could be easily verified.
VII. COMPUTATION, STORAGE AND TRANSMISSION OVERHEADS
Now, let describe the overheads induced by our protocol. We mainly focus on the following overheads: -BS's computation overhead to authenticate broadcasted packets.
-Receivers' computation overhead to check the packets authenticity. -Transmission overhead, which depends on the authenticator size generated by the BS per-packet, and forwarded by receivers. -Storage overhead on the BS and receivers, to store the key materials (key-chain parameters) generated by the BS. -Verification delay, which is the time packets of one interval Ii are buffered on receivers before being verified. Figures 5 and 6 , summarize the overheads induced by H 2 BSAP and μTESLA, respectively, where values between brackets [] apply only once per time interval. μTESLA protocol has lower computation, storage and transmission overheads than H 2 BSAP , because in μTESLA the BS uses a single key-chain to authenticate its data, whereas in H 2 BSAP , the BS uses l distinct key-chains. However, our protocol has a lower verification delay than μTESLA. In H 2 BSAP , a receiver buffers packets of a time interval Ii, for a duration of Tint + r × Hashop, whereas in μTESLA, all receivers buffer packets of a time interval Ii for a duration of δ × Tint. Knowing that performing a hash operation using SHA-1, took around Hashop=35 ms [10] , and that Tint is in the order of several seconds, it is clear that nodes in μTESLA buffer packets for a longer duration than in H 2 BSAP . Assuming our network depth is 10 hops, Tint=60s, and the disclosure delay δ=2, nodes in H 2 BSAP need to buffer packets of one time interval during at most 60.35s, whereas nodes in μTESLA need to buffer packets during 120s. Due to the long verification delay on μTESLA, receivers in μTESLA need to allocate more buffer space to store received packets than in H 2 BSAP .
VIII. LIMITATION AND IMPROVEMENTS
H 2 BSAP protocol mainly suffers from its restriction to static WSN, where nodes are considered to be static once deployed. In addition, like μTESLA, H 2 BSAP suffers from scalability issue, because it does not efficiently support multiple broadcast sources in the network.
H 2 BSAP induces some extra computation and transmission overheads in the BS, greater than the induced overheads in the μTESLA protocol. However, the BS being more powerful than sensors, it can afford these extra overheads in order to prevent the entire network against resource-draining DoS attacks. Moreover, H 2 BSAP introduces some extra transmission overhead on sensors, which forward packets with at most l MACs, whereas in μTESLA each packet carries a single MAC only. To reduce the transmission overhead per-packet, due to the authenticator size, we suggest to use either MACs of reduced size (4 bytes instead of 8 bytes), or to use Bloom filters [11] .
Using reduced MACs of 4-byte length, will decrease the maximum transmission overhead per packet from 8 × l bytes to 4 × l bytes. Having a maximum data payload of 104 bytes for Zigbee-compliant sensors [12] , and using 44 bytes of the payload for data transportation, we can support a large WSN of 15-hop depth, where the size of authenticator per packet is 15×4 = 60 bytes.
Using Bloom filter techniques, the BS first computes a set Si,j of l MACs per-packet Pi,j. However, unlike the original protocol (see section V-B), where each MAC was computed over the data and the previously computed MACs, each MAC now is computed only over the data i j Mi,j. Then, the BS computes an m-bit Bloom vector Vi,j over Si,j, where m << 8 × l× | MAC | (bits). In addition to its reduced size compared to the size of the set Si,j, Bloom vector Vi,j supports approximate queries membership over Si,j. If a candidate MAC value MAC ∈ Vi,j, then MAC ∈ Si,j, with high probability. Now, each packet sent by the BS, carries as authenticator Vi,j, instead of the set Si,j of l MACs. When the BS discloses key K r i , an r-hop distant sensor buffering a packet Pi,j = i j Mi,j Vi,j, first computes a candidate MAC MAC = MAC K r i (i j Mi,j), then checks that MAC ∈ Vi,j, in order to accept Pi,j as valid, with high probability, otherwise it drops it.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described H 2 BSAP , a time-asymmetry based BSAP, that efficiently thwarts resource-draining DoS attacks in WSN. H 2 BSAP limits the impact of a resource-draining DoS attack, to the one-hop neighbors of the attacker only, by achieving a delayed hopby-hop authentication/forwarding of broadcasted packets. In addition, H 2 BSAP considerably reduces the verification delay on sensors, where each receiver needs to buffer packets of one time interval for a small duration only. Moreover, H 2 BSAP introduces some extra overheads (computation, storage, transmission), which are acceptable and which can be further reduced using the improvements we are listing in section VIII. Simulation of H 2 BSAP is ongoing, and the results will be published in a next work.
As a future work, we plan to implement the improvements we suggested to the original H 2 BSAP protocol, and evaluate them through simulations. Mainly, we will implement the Bloom filter technique in order to reduce authenticator's size per packet, and we will implement the MPR-based broadcasting in order to reduce the transmission overhead on the network. We also plan to study the impact of nodes/BS mobility on our protocol.
